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The narratives of the world are without number* In the first pie 
the word "narrative1' covers an enormous variety of genres which are thee 
selves divided \ip between different subjects, as if any material was sui 
able for the composition of the narrative: the narrative may incorporatt 
articulate language, spoken or written; pictures, still or moving; ges­
tures and the ordered arrangement of all these ingredients: it is preset 
in myth, legend, fable, short story, epic, history, tragedy, comedy, 
pantomime, painting (Carpaccio's Saint Ursula, for example), stained 
glass windows, cinema, comic strips, journalism, conversation* In addi 
tion, under this almost infinite number of forms, the narrative is pres< 
at all times, in all places, in all societies; the history of the narra 
tive begins with the history of mankind; there does not exist, and neve 
has existed a people without narratives; all classes, all social groups 
have their narratives and very often the taste for these narratives is 
shared by men of different, even opposing cultures^ The narrative scor 
division into categories- of good and bad literature: transcending natio 
al, historical, cultural barriers, the narrative is there where life is
Should this universality of the narrative lead one to conclude 
that it ?s without significance? Is it so general that we can say noth 
about it,, only describe, specifically, a few of its variations, as do t 
literary histories, from time to time? But these variations, how can 
they be encompassed, on what basis can they be distinguished, recognise 
How can the short story be compared with the novel, the story with the 
myth, drama with tragedy (it has been done a thousand times) without 
reference to some standard? This standard is implied in any remark abo 
the most specific, the most historical of narrative forms* It is, ther 
fore, quite legitimate, far from renouncing any claim to be able to dis 
cuss the narrative, that people should, periodically, have considered 
the narrative form (since Aristotle); and it is not surprising that stu 
dents of structure should make of this form one of their first preoccu­
pations: is it not, for them, always a problem of encompassing the in­
finite number of words in order to arrive at a description of the "tong 
[langue] of which they are the issue, and from which they can be engen­
dered? In the face of the infinite number of narratives, the multitude 
of points of view from which they can be discussed (historical, psycho­
logical, axiological, ethnological, aesthetic etc.), the analyst finds 
himself in much the same position as Saussure in the face of the hetero 
elite nature of language and seeking to extract from the apparent anarc 
of the messages a principle of classification and basis of description. 
To confine ourselves to the present, the Russian Formalists, Propp, 
Levi-Strauss, have taught us to recognise the following problem: either 
the narrative is simply a hotch potch of events, in which case it can 
only be discussed by relying on the art, the talent or the genius of th 
narrator (the author) - all mythical forms of chance^- or it shares 
with other narratives a structure wnich can be analysed, however much 
patience that may require; there is a deep gulf between the most compl 
product of chance and the most simple conscious construction, and no on 
can construct (produce) a narrative, without reference to an implicit 
system of units and rules.
Where does one look for the structure of the narrative? In
2narratives, of oonrse.. All narratives? Many commentators who admit 
the idea of a narrative structure cannot reconcile themselveoto follow 
ing the example' of the experimental sciences in their .liwrary (analysis* 
They boldly suggest the application of a purely inductive'method to 
study the narrative, beginning with all the narratives of one genre, one 
period, or one society and thence proceeding to the! outline of a general 
pattern. This implies a Utopian view of man's interest* The science of 
linguistics itself, which has only three thousand languages to encompass 
does not attempt this; wisely, a deductive method h?s been adopted and 
since then it has really established itself and forged/ ahead even suc­
ceeding in predicting facts still to be discovered.* what abqut narra­
tive analysis confronted by millions of narratives? It must adopt a 
deductive process; first it must formulate a hypothetical pattern of 
description (what American students of linguistics call a "theory" 
[theorie], and thence cotae down gradually, from the starting point of 
this pattern, towards tile examples of narratives which at once conform 
with and differ from the pattern: it is only at the level of these con­
formities and differences that it will rediscover, now provided with a 
unique tpol of description, the multiplicity of narratives, their his­
torical, geographical, cultural diversity.^
Inorder to describe and classify the infinite number of narra­
tives, therefore, it is necessary to have a "theory" (in the pragmatic 
sense mentioned above) and the first task is to search for and to out­
line this theory.^ The elaboration of this theory can be greatly faci­
litated if one follows a pattern which will provide one with first terms 
and first principles. At the present stage of research it would seem
reasonable to adopt as a basic pattern for the structural analysis of
the narrative the science of linguistics itself.
1. THE LANGUAGE [LANGUE] OF THE NARRATIVE 
1. Beyond the Sentence
It is a well known fact that linguistics stops at the sentence:
it is the last unit which it feels qual.fied to deal with; if, in fact,
the sentence, being an orderly arrangement and not a series, cannot be 
reduced to the sum of the words of which it i6 composed, and thereby 
constitutes a primary unit, an utterance, on the other hand, is just the 
sum of the sentences of which it is composed: from the point of view of 
linguistics there is nothing in discourse which is not found in the sen­
tence: "The sentence", says Martinet, !,is the smallest segment which
is perf ectly and integrally representative of the discourse^. Linguis­
tics, therefore, would never deal with an object superior to the sentence 
for beyond the sentence there are only other sentences: when he has 
described the flower, the botanist does not go on to describe the bouquet
It is, however, evident that the discourse itself (cis a set of 
sentences) is organised and as a result of this organisation appears as 
the message of another higher language than that studied in linguistics 
the discourse has its units, its rules, its "grammar": beyond the sen­
tence, and composed solely of sentences, the discourse could easily be
3the, object of a second linguistic science* This linguistics of the dis­
course has long been possessed of a resounding names Rhetoric; but, due 
to a historical ktrick, as rhetoric passed into the field of belles- 
lettres, and the'study of belles-lettres became divorced from the study 
of language, it has recently become necessary to look at the problem 
afresh: the new linguistics of discourse has not yet been developed, but 
it has, at least, been postulated by the students of linguistics them­
selves. This fact is not without significance: although it constitutes, 
in itself, an autonomous study the discourse must be examined using lin­
guistics as the starting point; there must be formulated a working hypo­
thesis for am analysis which is a tremendous task and has to deal .with 
an infinite amount of material. The most reasonable idea would be to 
postulate a homological relationship between sentence and discourse, 
insofar as it is likely that the same formal organisation governs all 
semiotic systems, whatever their content and their dimensions: the dis­
course would be regarded .am a big “sentence*1 (the units of which need 
not necessarily be sentences), just as the sentence in certain respects, 
is a little "discourse". This hypothesis fits in well with certain pro­
positions of contemporary anthropology: Jakobsen sued Levi-Strauss have 
pointed out that the human race can be recognised by the ability to creat 
secondarysystems, "propagating systems" [demultiplicateurs], (tools usee 
to, make other tools, dual articulation of language, taboos on incest to 
allow the proliferation of families) and the Soviet student of linguistic 
Ivanov, assumes that artificial languages could only be acquired after a 
natural language: the important thing for man being the ability to use 
several systems of meaning, the natural language helps in the elaboratioi 
of the artificial languages. It is, therefore, quite permissible to 
postulate a "secondary" relationship between sentence and discourse - a 
relationship which we will describe as homological, in order to respect 
the purely formal nature of the interchanges.
The general language of the narrative is obviously only one of the 
idioms offered to the linguistics of discourse"^, which, in consequence, 
is subjected to the homological hypothesis: structurally the narrative 
has some of the characteristics of sentences without ever being reduced 
to bein; the^sum of a number of sentences: the narrative is a big sen­
tence just as every statement fphrase constative] is in some sense the 
outline of a little narrative. Although they possess certain important 
unique features, there are found in the narrative, enlarged and altered 
in proportion, the c ief features of the verb: tense, aspects, moods, 
persons; moreover, the “subjects" themselves, which are put in opposition 
to the verbal predicates, do not fail to follow a sentence pattern  ^
fmodele phrastique]: the typology of actants proposed by A.J. Greimas 
finds in the multitude of characters of the narrative the elementary 
functions of grammatical analysis. The homology suggested here does not 
have a purely heuristic value: it implies identification between language 
and literature (insofar as it is a sort of privileged vehicle for the 
narrative): it is now hardly possible to conceive of literature as an art 
totally divorced from any relations ip with language, as soon as it 
has been used to express an idea, passion or beauty;
(continued)
language walks hand in hand with the discourse reflecting its own 
structure: does not literature, today conspicuously, make a language 
of the very conditions of language?1^
2. The Levels of Meaning
From the outset linguistics provides the structural analysis 
of the narrative with a decisive concept, for, taking into account 
straight away what is essential in any system of meaning, that is its 
organisation, it allows one to, at the same time, state how a narra­
tive is not a simple sum of propositions and to classify the. huge 
mass of elements which go to make up a narrative. This concept is 
that of a level of description Fniveau de description].^3
It is a well-Kn wn fact that a sentence can be described, 
linguistically, at several levels (phonetic, phonological, grammati­
cal, contextual); these levels are related hierarchically, for, if 
each has its own units and its own correlations, necessitating an 
independent description for each one, no level can, on its own, be 
meaningful: each unit which belongs to a certain level only takes on 
a meaning if it is integrated into a higher level: a phoneme, although 
it is perfectly possible to describe it, is meaningless in itself; it 
only shares in a meaning if it is integrated into a word; and the word 
itself must be integrated into the sentence .^The theory, of levels 
(as set out by Benveniste) provides two t:rpes of relationships: 
distributional (if the relationships are on the same level), inte­
grative (if they are taken from one level to another). It follows 
from this that the distributional relationships are not sufficient 
to give meaning. In order to carry out a structural analysis it is 
nedessary, first of all, to distinguish several modes of decription 
and to place these modes in a hierarchical (integratory) perspective.
These levels are working processes.^^xt is natural, there-, 
fore, that as it proceeds, the science of linguistics tends to mul­
tiply them. The analysis of speech can, as yet, work only on the 
most rudimentary levels. According to its rules, rhetoric had 
assigned to discourse at least two^lanesof description: dispositio 
and elocutio.^k Nowadays, in his analysis of the structure of the 
myth, Levi-Strauss has already specified that the units which con­
stitute the mythic discourse (mythemes [mythemes]) only take on 
meaning because they are collected into groups and these groups 
themselves combine with each other; ^  and T. Todorov, talking up 
the distinction made by the Russian Formalists, proposes working on 
two main levels, themselves subdivided: the story (the plot), com­
prising a logical system of actions and a ^syntax1' of characters, 
and the discourse, comprising the tenses, aspects and the moods of 
the narrative.’’^ Whatever the number of levels proposed and however 
one defines them it is beyond doubt that the narrative is a hierarchy 
of modes. Understanding a narrative is not just following the thread 
of the story, it is also recognising the ‘^ stages", projecting the 
horizontal sequences of the narrative ''■thread1, on its own implied 
vertical axis; to read (listen to) a narrative is not iust to pass
5from one word to another, it also means passing from one level to 
another. If the reader will excuse a form of apologue here: in 
Poe's The Stolen Letter, he analysed precisely the failure of the 
Chief of Police who was powerless to recover the letter: his inves­
tigations were'* perfect, he said, "within the bounds of his own 
special function11: he searched everywhere, he completely ’'saturated" 
the level of the "search"; but, in order to find the letter, which 
was protected by his crudity of action, he needed tp pass to another 
level, to substitute the mind of the concealer for that of the 
policeman. In the same way, the "search" carried out on a horizontal 
collection of narrative relationships, no matter how completely, is 
valueless unless it is combined with a "vertical" examination: the 
meaning is not at the end of the narrative, it cuts through it in 
cross section; potentially as easy to find as The Stolen Letter, 
the meaning will equally elude a purely unilateral search.
Much more exploration will still be necessary before it is 
possible to fix the levels of the narrative. Those which will be 
proposed here constitute a provisional outline, the advantage of 
which is, as yet, almost exclusively didactic: they allow one to 
locate and to group the problems without conflicting with the few 
analysed which have already been carried out.^9 It is proposed 
that one should distinguish in the narrative three levels of de­
scription: the level of the "functions" (in the sense of the v/ord 
as it is used by Propp and Bremond), the level of the "actions"
(in the sense in which Greimas uses the v/ord when he speaks of char­
acters as actants [those who perform actions]) and the level of the 
"narration" (which is, loosely, the level of the "discourse"^ 
Todorov). It should be remembered that these throe levels are 
linked together according to a progressive method of integration: 
a function only has meaning when it is placed in the general action 
of an actant; and this action itself receives its ultimate signi­
ficance from the fact that it is narrated, placed in a discourse 
which has its own code.
II THE FUNCTIONS
1• To Determine the Units
Since all systems consist of a combination of units, the 
categories of which are known, the first essential is to divide up 
the narrative and to determine the sections of the discourse which 
can be assigned to a small number of categories; in a v/ord, the 
smallest narrative units must be defined.
In accordance with the integrative perspective defined 
above, the analysis cannot be satisfied with a purely distributional 
definition of the units: from the outside the meaning must be the 
criterion of the unit: it is the functional nature of certain sec­
tions of the story which make them units: from this comes the name 
"functions" which we have given to these primary units. Since the
PO
Russian Formalists any section of the story, which appears as the 
of a correlation has been recognised as a unit* The essence of any 
function is ijts seminal quality which enables it to plant in the narr<* 
tive an olemeAt which will develop later, on the sane level or even 
ou another level: if, in Un Coeur Simplet Flaubert informs us at a cer 
tain moment, apparently casually, that the daughters of the sous-prefe 
of Pont-l'Evequc had a parrot, it is because the parrot is now to assu 
an important role in the life of Felicite; the utterance of this detai 
(whatever its linguistic form) constitutes a function, or narrative 
unit.
Is everything in a narrative functional? Does everything, down 
the smallest detail, have a meaning? Can the whole narrative be divia 
up into functional units? It will be seen, there sire probably several 
types of function, since there sire several t: pes of correlation. This 
does not alter the fac't that a narrative is never composed only of 
functions: everything In a nsirrative, to a greater or lesser decree, 
has significance. This is not a question of art (on the part of the 
nsirrative), it is a question of structure: what is noted in the order 
of tho discourse is, by definition, of note: even when a detail appear 
utterly without significance, devoid of any function, it still must 
have a function, if only to establish absurdity: everything ismeamingf 
or nothing is. In other words it could be said that art does not re­
cognise simple noise [bruit] (in the informational sense of the word)^ 
it is a pure system, there is never a lost unit22, however long, loose 
thin the thread which links it to one of the levels of the story.23
The function is obviously, from the linguistic point of view, 
a unit of content: it is ‘'what ij^meant by" an utterance which distin­
guishes it as a unit of function , not the way in which it is said.
If I am told (in Goldfinger) that James Bond saw a nan of about fifty 
etc., the information includes two functions at one, two functions of 
different degrees of importance: on tho one hand the ago of the char­
acter is integrated into a portrait (the ‘'usefulness" of which, for 
the rest of the story, is not nil, but diffuse end delayed) and on the 
other hand the immediate meaning of the utterance is that Bond does 
not know his future interlocutor: the unit implies therefore a very 
strong correlation (beginning of a threat and need co identify). In 
order to determine the primary narrative units it is, therefore, neces­
sary never to lose sight of the functional nature of the sections being 
examined, and to admit in advance that this functional nature will not 
conflict hopelessly with the forms which we recognise traditionally in 
the different parts of the narrative discourse, (actions, scenes, para­
graphs, dialogues, interior monologues etc.), still less with the 
‘'psychological1' categories (behaviour, feelings, intentions, motivation, 
rationalisations of characters).
In tae same way, since the ["langue "] of the narrative is not the 
["langue''] of articulated language - although often accompanied by it - 
the narrative units will be largely independent of the linguistic units: 
of course it is possible fo thorn to coincide but only occasionally, not 
systematically, the functions will be represented sometimes by higher ur.
than the sentence (groups of sentences of different sizes, as far 
as the whole work) sometimes lower (the sxntagm, the word, and even, 
in the word, certain literary elements); ''when we are told that 
when Bond is on guard in his office at M15 ®nd the telephone rings,
"Bond picked up one of the four receivers", the four consti­
tutes a whole functional unit in itself, since it refers to an 
essential concept on which the whole story is based (that of devel­
oped bureaucratic technique); in fact the narrative unit is not 
here the linguistic unit (the word) but only its connoted value 
(linguistically, the word four never means ::fourP; this explains 
how certain functional units can be of a lower order than the 
sentence, without ceasing to belong to the discourse: they exceed, 
the limits not of the sentence, to which they i|pmain materially 
inferior, but the level of denotation, which, like the sentence, 
belongs specifically to^  the domain of linguistics.
2. Classification of Units
These functional units must be divided up into a small 
number o£ categories. If one wants to determine these categories 
without recourse to the material of the contents (psychological 
material for example), it is necessary to again consider the dif­
ferent levels of meaning: some units have as correlates units of 
the same level; but, in order to cover others it is necessary to 
proceed to another level. Thus, fro.' the beginning, one finds 
two main categories of functions, some distributional, the others 
integrative. The former correspond to Propp's functions, which 
have been notably taken up by Bremond, but wnich we are examining 
here in much greater detail than these authors; it is for these 
that the name "function" will be reserved (although the other 
units are also functional [connected with functions]); the example 
is a classic one since Tomachevski's analysis: the purchasing of 
a revolver has as its correlate the moment when it will be used 
(and, if it is not used, the notation becomes a sign of an impulsive 
action etc'.); picking up the telephone has as its correlate the 
moment of hanging up; the entry of the parrot into Felicite's house 
has as its correlate the episodes when it is stuffed and when it 
is worshipped etc. The second main categor ' of units , those which 
are integrative in , comprises all^-the indications [indices]
(in the very general sense of the word) ; the unit refers, there­
fore, not to a complementary and consequent -,ct, but to a more or 
less diffusa concept, which is, however, essential to the meaning 
of the story: indications of personality concerning the characters, 
information relating to their identity, notations of Hatmosphere", 
etc.; the relationship between the unit and its correlate is not, 
therefore, distributional (often several indications refer to the 
same signified feature and their order of appearance in the discourse 
is not necessarily relevant), but integrative; in oroer to understand 
"what purpose is served" by a notation of indication [notation in- 
dicielle] it is necessary to pass to a higher level (actions of
8the characters oV narration), for it is only there that the indication 
is fulfilled; the power of the administration which is behind Bond, 
indicated by the number of telephones, indicates nothing about the 
sequence of actions in which Bond engages in receiving the communi­
cation; it only takes on its significance at the level of a general 
typology of the actants (Bond is on the side of order); the indica­
tions, as a result of the, to some extent, vertical nature of their 
relationships, are truly semantic units, for, in contrast with the 
“functions", properly speaking, they refer to a signified feature, 
not to an "operation"; the sanction of the Indications is fhigher", 
sometimes even outside the explicit syntagm (the “personality" of 
a character can never be named but is continually being indicated), 
it is a paradigmatic sanction; in contrast, the sanction of the 
"Functions" is always only "further on", it is a syntagmatic sanc­
tion. ^ 7 Functions and indications recall, therefore, another classical 
distinction; the Functions imply metonymic relata, the Indications 
metaphoric relata; one corresponds £o a functionality of doing, the 
other to tL functionality of being.^
, These two main categories of units, Functions and Indica­
tions, should make possible a certain classification of narratives. 
Some narratives are strongly functional (for example, folk tales) 
and some others axe strongly indicational (for example, "psycholo- 
gical"novals); between these two extremes there exists a whole range 
of intermediate examples depending on their historical, background, 
society, genre. 3ut this is not all: within each of these main 
categories it is immediately possible to recognise two sub-divisions 
of narrative units. To return to the category of Functions, its 
units axe not all of the same "importance"; some constitute real 
hinges in the narrative (or parts of the naxrative); others only 
"fill up" the narrative space between the function hinges: let us 
call the former cardinal functions (or nuclei) and the latter, be­
cause of their complementary nature, catalysises. For a function 
to be cardinal it is sufficient for the action to which it refers 
to open (or maintain, or close) an alternative route on which the 
progress of the story depends, that is, to introduce or terminate 
some uncertainty; if, in a part of the narrative, the phone rings, 
it is equally possible that it might or might not be answered, 
either of which occurrences would take the story along a different 
path. Between two cardinal functions it is alv/ayspossible to distri­
bute secondary notations which will collect around one nucleus or 
another without modifying the essential nature of the alternative 
course: the space wliich separates "the phone rang" and "Bond picked 
up the receiver"' can be saturated with a mu.1 tituae of tiny incidents 
or pieces of description: "Bond v/enc toward, the desk, lifted a re­
ceiver, put down uis cigarette"', etc. These catalysises remain 
functional, insofar as they are correlated with a nucleus, but their
9functionality is dininshed, unilateral, parasitic: the fact is 
that here it j^ G a natter of a purely chronological functionality 
(what is being described is what separates two moments in the story) 
while the link which unites two cardinal functions is invested with 
a double functionality, at the same time chronological and logical: 
the catalysts are only consecutive units, the cardinal functions 
are at once consecutive and dependent. Everything leads to the 
thought that, in fact, the mainspring of narrative.activity is the 
confusion of the consecutive and the dependent [consequence], what 
comes after being read in the narrative as if it is caused by; if this 
were the case the narrative would be a systematic application of the 
logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc; which could even be the 
motto of Destiny, of which the narrative is only the "language"$ 
and this "crushing" of*logic and temporality is accomplished by the 
framework of the cardinal functions. These functions may, at first 
sight, appear quite insignificant; they are distinguished not by the 
spectacular (the importance, size, variety or strength of the stated 
action) but by their quality of risk: the cardinal functions are the 
moments of risk in the narrative; between these points of alternatives 
these bespatchers", the catalysises form zones of safety, rest, luxur 
this luxury is not without use however: from the point of view of the 
story, it must be repeated, the catalysises can have a weak but not a 
non-existent function: were it completely redundant (in relation to 
its nucleus) it would not share any the less in the economy of the 
message, but this is not the case: an apparently expletive notation 
always has a discursive function: it accelerates, delays, restarts 
the discourse, it summarises, anticipates, even sends off course^; 
what is noted always appearing of note, the catalysisis is constantly 
arousing the semantic tension of the discourse, is always saying: 
there has been, there will be meaning; the constant function of the 
catalyst therefore, whatever the circumstances, is a Phatic one (to us 
Jakobsen's_term): it maintains the contact between the narrator and th 
narratory [narrataire]. One might say that a nucleus cannot be 
suppressed- without altering the story, but nor can a catalysisis be 
suppressed without altering the discourse. As for the second main 
category of narrative units (the indications), an integrative category 
the units found in it have in common the feature that they cannot be 
saturated (completed) except at the level of the characters or of the 
narration; they are, therefore, part of a parametric^relationship, 
the second implicit form of which is continuous, extended to an 
episode, a character or a complete work; however, it is possible to 
distinguish in it indications or perly speaking, by reference to a 
personality, a feeling, an atmosphere (suspicion, for example), 
a philosophy and pieces of information which serve to identify, to 
locate in time and space. To say that Bond is on guard in an office, 
the open window of which reveals the moon amidst great rolling clouds, 
is to indicate a stormy sumr.'.c-r night, and this deduction itself forms 
an indication of atmosphere which relates tc the heavy climate, giving 
warning of an action as yet unknown. The indications, therefore, 
always include these implicit signified features; the pieces of 
information on the other hand do not, at least on the level of the
10
3tcry! they are purely pieces of data, the sijpificance of i^hice 
is imediately Apparent. The indications inply a deciphering processi 
for the reader it is a natter of learning to recognise a paroonality, 
an atmosphere } the pieces of infornation [ informants ] provide readymade 
knowledge; their functionality, like that of the catalycis&s, is therefore 
weak but not non-existent: whatever its "deadness" in relation to the 
rest of the story, the infornation (for example the exact age cf a 
character) serves to authenticate the reality of the referent (object 
refered to), to anchor the fiction in reality: it is an operation for 
realism [operateur realise J and by this token, possesses an 
incontestable fun^jonality, not at the level of the story but at that 
of the discourse.
Nuclei and catalysises,indications and informations (again the names 
scarcely matter), such it'seems, are the primary categories into which 
'./ill be divided the units^of the level of functions. Two remarks are 
necessary to complete thi3 classification. In the first place, a 
unit nay belong to two different categories at once: to drink a whisky 
(in an airport departure hall) is an action which can act as a catalyst 
to the (cardinal) notation of waiting but it is also, at the same time, 
the indication of a certain atmosphere (modern, relaxed, remembered etc.)'* 
in other words, certain units can be mixed. As a result of this a 
whole game can be played with the economy of the narrative-} in the 
novel Goldfinger, 3ond, before searching his adversary's rocm, is given 
a master key by his colleague: the notation is a pure (cardinal) 
function} in the fil* this detail is altered: Bond, with a joke, takes 
a bunch of keys from an unprotesting chamber-maid} the notation is 
nc longer purely functional but also indicaticnal, relating tc Sond'o 
personality (his casualncss and hi3 appeal to 'women). In the second 
place, it must be pointed out (something v/hich will be take:: up again 
later) that the four categories just discussed may be divided up in a 
different way, following more closely the pattern of linguistics.
The catalysisis indications and informations have, in fact, a common 
characteristic: they are expansions, in relation tc the nuclei: the nuclei 
(as will be shown shortly) fora complete groups of a small umber of 
finite entities, they are governed by a system of logic, they are 
at once necessary and self sufficient: given this framework, the ether 
units come in to fill it out according to a method of proliferation, 
v/hich is, in theory, infinite} this is ju3t like the sentence made up 
of simple propositions infinitely complicated byy means of repetition, 
padding etc. Like the sentence the narative crji be subjected to an 
infinite process of catalysis. Mai lame attached ouch, importance 
to this type of structure that he used it for his p-.er; "Jamais un coup de 
dec" v/hich can be considered with its "knots" and "bellies", its "knot 
words" and "lace words" as the coat of arms of any narrative - any 
language.
3. The Syntax of the Functions.
In what way, according to what "grammatical structure" arc these 
different units linked together through the course of the narrative 
i Wiat are the rules which govern the combination cf the 
functions ? The informations and the indications can be freely put 
into corabinatidn among themselves: this i3 illustrated for example, 
by the portrait which juxtaposes civil status and traits of character.
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A simple relationship of implication unites these catalysises and 
nuclei: a cata^ysisis necessarily implies the existence of a 
cardinal function to \hich to attach ;.itself, but not in a reciprocal 
attachment. As for the cardinal functions, they are united in a 
relationship of joint responsibility: a function of this sort depends 
on another of the same sort, end the relationship is interdependent. 
This last relationship oust be examined for a moment: first because 
it defines the very framework of the narrative (any expansions c^n be 
suppressed, but not the nuclei); secondly because it is the principle 
concern of anyone trying to establish the facts about narrative 
structure.
It has already been pointed out that, by its very structure, 
the narrative institutes a confusion between consecutive and con­
sequent [dependent], tipie and logic. It is this ambiguity which 
constitutes the central^ problem of the syntax of narrative structure.
Is there, behind the ti-rie pattern of the narrative, a logic that is 
outside time? Uven recently this point divided researchers. Propp, 
whose analysis opened up the way to present studies, holds absolutely 
to the unshakeable principle of chronological order: ir» his view time 
is realiffy, and for this reason it seems to him essential to establish 
the story in time. However, Aristotle himself, in contrasting 
tragedy ‘(defined by the unity of action) and historj' (defined by the 
plurality of the actions and the unity of time) was already assuming th 
primacy of logic over chronology.This is what is being done by 
contemporary researcher (Levi-Strauss, Greimas, Bremond, Todorov) 
who would doubtless subscribe (nowever much they night differ on other 
points) to Lcvi-Strauss's proposition "The order of chronological 
succession is absorbed into an atemporal matrix structure".^ The 
present analysis in fact tends to "dechronologise" the continuity of 
the narrative, to "relogify" it, to subject it to what hallarrae, talkin 
about the French language, called "the primitive moulds of logic.
Or, more exactly - at least we hope so - the task is that of trying to 
give a structural description of the chronological illusion; the logic 
of the narrative must ^ccount for the time sequence of the narrative.
It could be said, in other words, that the temporality [time structure] 
is only a category of structure in the narrative (discourse), just as 
in language, time only exists in the form of a system; from the point 
of view of the narrative, what we call time does not exist, or at least 
only exists in a functional way, as an element of a semiotic system: 
time does not belong to the discourse, properly speaking, but to the 
referent; the narrative and language only recognise a scmiological tine 
structure; the 'real" tine is only a "realistici:, referential illusion, 
as is shown by Propp's commentary, and it is thus that structural des­
cription should treat it.35
What then is this logic which binds the principle funct ons of 
the narrative? This is what researchers have been trying to establish 
and what has caused, up to now, the most argument. We shall return 
therefore to the contributions of Greimas, Cl. Bremond end f. Tod­
orov, which are published in this edition, and which deal with the 
logic of the functions. all the chief directions which research
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has taken-'appear, set out below by Todorov. The first (Bremond) is 
the most prapdply logical: it involves reconstituting the syntax of the 
human behaviour sot in action by the narrative, retracing the path of 
the '’choices" to which, at each point in the story, a certain character 
is fatally subjected^°and thereby to ox.-ose what one might call a logic 
of energy37sin.ee it takes possession of the characters at the moment 
they choose to act. The second direction is linguistic (Levi-Strauss, 
Greimas): the essential preoccup.nti n of this method is to find, in 
the functions, paradigmatic contrasts, these contrasts co forming to 
the Jokobsenian principle of the "poetic" [poetique], being "stretched 
out" throughout the fabric of the narrative (we shall seChere the new 
development^; with which Greimas corrects or completes th# paradigaatism 
of the functions). The third direction, outlined by Todorov is some­
what different since it; sets the analysis at the level of the "actions11 
(that is, the character.^), attempting to establish rules by which the 
narrative combines, varies and alters a certain number of basic pre­
dicates.
It is not a m-tter of choosing these working hypotheses; they are 
not in competition but concurrent, moreover fully elevated. The only 
addition which we will suggest here concerns the dimensions of the 
analysis* . Even if one sets aside the indications, informations and 
catalysises, there sti1! remains in a narrative (especially if one is 
dealing with a novel, and not a short story) a large number of cardinal 
functions; many of these cannot be controlled by the analyses quoted, 
which have so far worked on the main articulations of the narrative. 
However, it is necessary to presume a sufficiently detailed description 
to account for all the units of the narrative. Of its smallest segment, 
the cardinal functions, let us re..ember, cannot be determined by their 
"importance", but only by the (doubly implicative) nature of their 
relationsuips: a "telephone call", however trivial it seea6, on one 
hand comprises, in itself, several Cardinal functions (ringing, lifting 
the receiver, peaking, hanging up), and on the other hand, taking it as 
a whole, ..it must be possible to connect it, at least by degrees, to 
the main articulations of the anecdote. The function covering of the 
narrative imposes an organisation of stages of which the basic unit 
can only be a small group of functions whic will be called here 
(after Cl. Bremond) a sequence.
A sequence is a logical succession of nuclei linked to each other 
b^  interdependent relati nshipc:38the sequence opens when one of its 
terms has no dependent antecondent and closes when another of its terms 
has no dependent successor. To take a trivial exa .pie, ordering a 
drink, receiving it, drinking it, pacing for it: these different 
functions form what is obviously a closed sequence, since it is 
impossible tc have something preceding the order or following the 
payment without stepping outside the homogeneous whole of ‘•Drink''.
The sequence in fact c^n always be named. Determining the main 
functions of the short story, Propp, then Bremond, have already been 
led to name them (Deceit, Betrayal, .Struggle, Contract, Seduction etc.); 
the naming process is equally inevitable for trivial sequences, what 
one might call '‘micro-sequences", tnose which form the finest threads 
of the narrative fabric. Are these namings solely in the province of the
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analyst* In othor words are they purely raeta-linguistic? It
would seen so, for they deal with the code of the narrative, but it 
is possible to see then forming part of a metalanguage witnin the reader 
(listener) himself, who grasps each logical succession c? actions as 
a nominal whole: to read is to name, to listen is not only to perceive 
a language but also to construct it. The sequence titles are quite 
analagous to the cover words of translating machines which Cover 
acceptably a great variety of meanings and nuances. Che language of 
the narrative, which is in us, immediately comprises these essential 
Rubrics: the closed logic which forms the structure of a sequence is 
indissolubly linked to its name: any function which inviolates a. 
seduction imposes, from the moment of its arpeoribice, in the name which 
it causes to emerge, the grfiola process of the seduction, such as we know 
it from all the narratives which have formulated within us the language 
of the narrative.
However slight its importance, being composed of a 3i:iall number of 
nuclei (that is, in fact, of "dispatchers"), the sequence always comprises 
moments of risk, and it. is this which justifies its analysis: it might 
seem derisory to call sequence the logical succession of minute acts 
which form the offer of a cigarette (offering, accepting, lighting, 
smoking); but what is important is that at each cf these points , an 
alternative, and therefore a freedom of choice cf direction fliberte de sens] 
is possible: du Pont, James Bond's colleague offers him a light from 
his cigarette-lighter, but Bond refuses, the meaning of this refusal 
is that Bond instinctively fears the gadget is booby-trapped^ .
The sequence is therefore, one might say, a logical tiireat unit 
[unite logique menacee]: this is what justifies it a minimo. It is 
also based " maxi me: enclosed in these functions, subsumed under a 
name, the sequence itself constitutes a new unit, ready to function 
3inply as another, larger sequence. Here is a univo-sequonce: Held out 
one's hand, shake it, let go; this greeting becomes a simple function: 
on one hand it has the role of an indication (du Pent's softness and 
3ond's repugnance), and on the other hand it is the ter::: of a vido 
sequence, denoted by Meeting, the other terms of which (approach, pause, 
challenge, greeting, consolidation) can, themselves, be nicro-sequences.
A whole network of subrogations thus gives a structure to the narrative, 
the smallest matrices to the largest functions. It is a matter here of 
course, of a hierarchy which remains withing the level of functions:
It is only when the narrative has been able to expand gradually, from 
du Pont's cigarrette to the fight between Bond and GolGfinger, that the 
analysis of functions is terminated: the pyramid formed by the functions 
then attains the next level (that of the Actions). There is therefore, 
a syntax within the sequences and a (subrogating) syntax between the 
sequences. The first episode of Golifinger thus takes in a sort of 
"Stedi " effect:
Request




Approach Address Greeting Fellow up
' v
Holding out Shaking Letting it 
90Hand it
This representation is obviously analytic. The reader perceives a 
linear succession of terns. But it is necessary to point out that 
the .terras of several sequences might well overlap! sequence is not 
terminated when the initial tern of a n^  sequence intervenes: the 
sequences are arranged in counterpoint, frora the point of view of 
functions the structure of the narrative is firural: this is how the 
narrative at once "holds" and "aspires". The overlapping of the sequences 
can only, in fact, be permitted to cease, within a work, by a phenomenon 
of radical rupture, if the several tightly cots posed blocks (or "Ste..- 
which form it, are somehow recovered at the higher level of the Actions 
(characters): Goldfinger is composed of three functionally interdependent 
episodes, since on two occasions their functional step- p .r cease to 
communicate:^there is no sequential relationship between the swimming 
pool and Fort Knox episodes, but there is still a relationship on the 
level of the Actions, since the characters (and in consequence, the 
structure of their relationships) are the same. One recognises here the 
epic ("collection of multiple fables") the epic is a narrative broken at 
the level of functions but united at the level of actions (this can be 
demonstrated in the Gdyssy or Brecht's drama). It is therefore, necessary 
to place on top of the level of functions (which provides the sajor part 
of the narrative syntagma) a higher level, from which, gradually, the 




1. A Structural Definition of the characters.
In Aristotelean poetics the ration of character is secondary, entirely 
subordinate to the ration of action: it is possible says Aristotle, to 
have fables without "characters" but not characters without fables. This 
view was taken up by the classical theorists (Vossius} 'lere'f the characte 
who, till then,* was only a name, the agent of an action" took on a
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psychological cd»nsistency, became an individual, a "person"j in short, 
a fully constituted being, without doing anything, even before acting^2 ; 
the character ceased to be subordinated to the action, suddenly took on 
a psychological essence; these essences could be classified, the-clearest 
example of this being the list of stock characters of the bourgeois 
theatre [theatre bourgeois] (the coquette, noble father etc*). Since 
it first appeared, structural analysis has been most reluctant to deal 
with the character as an essence, even for purposes of classification; 
as T. Todorov reminds us, in this edition, Toaachovski went so for as to 
deny the character any narrative importance, a point of view which he 
later came to modify. Without going so far as to ignore the characters 
in this analysis Propp reduced them to a simple typology based not on 
psychology but on the actions they perform (giver of the talisman, 
accomplice, villain etc;.).
Since Propp the character has always posed the same problem in 
structural analysis of the narrative: on one hand the characters (whatev 
name one gives them: dramatis personae or actants [those who perform an 
action]) form a necessary plan of description, outside which the smalles 
related 'Actions’5 cease to bo intelligible, so that, in fact, one might 
say that it is impossible to have a narrative without "characters"^ or 
at least without "agents"; but on the other hand these very numerous 
"agents" cannot be described or classified in termsof "people" [persons] 
whether one considers the '’person" as a purely historical form restrictc 
to certain genres (true, those best known to us) and in consequence make 
exception of the case (a very extensive one) of all narratives (folk tal 
contomporary texts) which admit of agents but not of people; or whether ■ 
claims that the person is always only a critics' rationalisation imposed 
in our time on what are, in fact, simple narrative agents. Structural 
analysis, whic- is always very careful to avoid defining characters in 
terms of psychological essences, has striven, up till now, through diver; 
hypotheses, which will be found reflected in some of the contributions 
which follow, to define the character not as a "being” but as a "parties 
pant". For--'61. Bremond, each character can be the agent of sequences of 
actions proper to himself (Deceit, Seductioh); when one sequence implies 
two characters (as is usually the case), the sequence has two perspectiv< 
or, if you prefer, twe names (what is Deceit for one is the process of 
bein„ deceived [Dupere] for the other); in short, each character, even 
the secondary ones, is the hero of his own sequence. Todorov, analysing 
"psycuological"novel (Les Liaisons Dangereuses) takes as his point of 
departure not the character-people [personnageo-pcrconnes] but the three 
main relationships in which they are involved, and whicn he calls basic 
predicates (love, communication, help); those relationships are subjectec 
in the analysis to two sorts cf rules: of derivation [derivation] when 
it is a question of rendering an account of other relationships .and of 
action [action] Wi.cn it is a question of describing changes in these 
relationships in the course of the story: there are many characters in 
Lea Liaisons Pangereusos but "what is said about them" [ce qvi on dit] 
(their predicates) can be classified. Finally, n.J. arenas has proposed 
that the characters of the narrative should be described and classified,
16
not according V> what they are, but according to what.thay,;do, (hence th> 
name actants), insofar as they form part of three great ^jtoiuuntic axes, 
which moreover are also found in the sentence (subject, object,-. 
adjectival complement, adverbial complement [comptement_d*attribution, 
complement circonstantier])and which are communication, desire (or ques 
and p r o o f a s  the parts of the axis go in pairs, so the infinitely lar 
world of the characters is also subject to a paradigmatic structure 
(subject/object, giver/receiver, helper/opposer) projected throughout 
the course of the narrative and as the actant defines a category its pa 
can bo fulfilled by different actors, mobilised according to the rules 
of multiplication, substitution or subtraction [carence].
These three concepts have many points in common. The c. ief on 
it must be reiterated, js that of defining the character in terms of hi 
participation in a sphere of actions, these spheres being few in number 
typical, classifiable; ^hat is why we have called the second level of 
description the level of Actions, despite the fact that it is the level 
of the characters: the word action should not be understood here in the 
sense of J;ho little acts which go to make up the fabric of the first 
level, but in the sense of the great articulations of the praxis (de­
siring, communicating, struggling).
2. The Problem of the Subject
The problems raised by a classification of the characters of t 
narrative have not yet really been solved. Certainly there is agreemen 
in the idea that the innumerable characters of the narrative can be 
subjected tc rules of substitution and that, even within a work, one fi( 
may incorporate different characters^ on the other hand the notion 
of actants [modele actantiere] proposed by Greimas (and taken up from a 
different point of view hy Todorov) seems to stand up to testing by a 
large number of narratives: like all structural models it is less 
valuable lor its basic [canonique] form (a matrix of six actants) than 
for the controlled changes (subtractions, confessions, duplications, 
substitutions) to which it lends itself, giving rise to hopes of a 
typology of actants for narratives**®; however, when the matrix is strong 
from the point of view of classification (as is the case with Greimas' 
actants) it is less successful from the point of view of the multiplied 
of the participations; as soon as they are analysed in terms of perspec­
tives and whan these perspectives are respected (as in Bremond's descrij 
tion) the character system remains too fragmented; the reduction propose 
by Todorov avoids both these difficulties, but it -as sc far been applie 
to only one narrative. It would seem that these difficulties may 
easily by dealt with. The real difficulty raised by the classification 
of the characters is the place (and, therefore, the existence) of the 
subject in any matrix of actants, whatever its formation. Who is the 
subject (the hero) of a narrative? Is there - or is there not - a 
privileged category of actors? One novel has accustomed us to 
accentuate, in one way or another, sometimes in a very indirect way 
(a negative way), one character more than the others. But this special 
case treatment [privilege] nowhere near covers all narrative literature.
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Thua nany "narratives set in conflict, around soue point of rivalry, 
two adversaries whose "actions" are, in these ways,'cade equal} the 
subject is then truly dual without any possibility of further reducing 
it by substitution; it is perhaps a current archaic fora, as if the 
• narrative, like certain languages, had also possessed a duality of 
persons. This duality is even More interesting in that it relates the 
narrative: to the structure of certain (very modern) ranee in Which matched 
opponents try to gain possession of an object put into the gdaO by .on , 
umpire; this scheme recalls the matrix of actants proposed by Greimas 
and it is not surprising*: if one dohsiders that the gone, being a language, 
springs from the same symbolic structure, as that found in language and in 
the narrative the gam tools a sentence^ • If therefore, the privileged 
category of actors is retained (the subject of the quest, the drive, the 
action) it is necessary at- least to make it more flexible, subjecting this 
actant to the. categories of the person, not the psychological but the 
grammatical person: once again it will be necessary to turn to linguistics 
in order tp describe and to classify the mode of the action, whether it be 
personal «<l/you) or apersonal (it), singular^ dual or plural; It will be 
perhaps - the gramatical categories of the person (accessible through 
our pronouns) whichwill provide the key to the level of action. But 
•as these categories can only be define^in relation to the node of-the 
discourse, and not to that of reality, the charactors, as units of the 
level of action, only find their meaning (their intelligibility) if they 
are integrated into the third level, that of description, which we shall 
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Just as there is, within the narrative, an important exchange 
function (divided between a giver and a receiver), so, homologically, 
the narrative, as the object, is the central element of a' communication: 
there is a giver of the narrative, and one to whoa it is given. It is a 
well known fact that in linguistic communication and you each presuppose 
the existence of the other; in the 3aice way.it is impossible to have a 
narrative without a narrator or without a listener (or reader). This 
notion is perhaps obvious, but has not been fully explored. Certainly 
the role of the originator of the narrative has been discussed in various 
terms (one studies tho "ahthor" of a novel without considering whether 
he is, in fact, the "narrator") but when one turns to the reader literary 
theorists are much more circumspect. In fact the problem is not the 
introspection of the narrator's motives, nor the effects the narration 
produces^bn the reader; it is to describe the code through which narrator 
and reader are signifiedin the course of tho narrative itself. The 
narrators signs see.:, at first sight to be more e?3ily visible and more 
numerous than those of the reader (a narrative says _I more often than 
you)j in fact the latter are just less obvious than the former; thus, 
every time the narrator ceasing to "represent", relates facts of which he 
is perfectly avaro, but of which the reader is ignorant, there occurs, 
by reason of absence [carence] a reading sign [signo do lectureJ for there 
is no reason for the narrator to give himself information: Loo was the 
oimer of this night club , a first person novel informs 0 3: this is a 
reader's sign, close to what Jako'oson calls the function of communication. 
Lacking a system of classification we will, for tho moment, leave aside 
the reception signs [signes de recaption J (equal ljj^  import ant though they 
are), to say a word about the signs of narration.
Who is tho originator of tho narrative ? Three concepts seem to have 
been stated so far. The first considers the narrative to be uttered by 
a person (in the fully psychological sense of the verd); ^his person has 
a name, he is the author within whom there is a constant exchange between 
the "personality" and the act of a fully identified individual, who 
periodically picks up his pen to write a story: the narrative (particularly 
the novel) is only, then, the expression of an I which ia external to it. 
The second concept regards the narrator as a sort of total consciousness, 
apparently impersonal, which utters the story from a superior standpoint, 
that of Cod'* . The narrator is at once within his characters (for he 
knows everything that is going on inside then), and outside them (for he 
never identifies himself with one riore than another). The third, and most 
recent concept (Henry Janes, Sartra.,) decrees that the narrator should 
limit his narrative to what can bo observed or known by the characters: 
everything happens as if each character was, in turn, the originator of 
the narrative. Those three concepts are equally at fault in that te.p, 
all three, see in the narrator and in the characters, real "living" people
EV The Narration.
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(the inexhaustible power of this literary nyth is vroll known), as if 
the narrative determined its own level of reference [niveau referential 
(it is always a case of equally "realistic" concepts), butt at least 
from our point of view, narrator and characters are equally "abstract 
notions" letres de papier - beings of paper 1 ; the (physical [natorielj ) 
author of a narrativo must, in no way, bo confused with the narrator of 
this narrative; the narrator's signs are immanent to tho narrative, 
and in consequence, are perfectly accessible to sociological analysis 
but to decide that tho author hicsclf (whether he advertises his presence, 
hides it, or effaces himself completely) has at his disposal signs 
which ho distributes through his work, it is necessary to assume- between 
the "person" and his language a signnlctic relationship which renders 
the author a fully constituted subject and the narrative the instrumental 
expression of this fullness: this is a notion to which structural analysis 
cannot subscribe: who sppaks £in the narrative) is not who writes (in life) 
and who writes is not who is'' •
In fact, tho narrative, properly speaking (cr the narrator's code) 
only recognises, like language, two systems of signs: personal and 
a-gGrsorjplj these two systems arc not necessarily market by the linguistic 
features pertaining to the person (I) and the nen-parsen (ha/it); 
for example,, it is possible to have narratives, or at least episodes, 
written in the third person and yet the real raode or which is the first 
person. How can one decide? All that is necessary is to rewrite the 
narrative (of the passage) transposing it from he to I: sc long as this 
operation involves no alteration of the discourse except the actual 
changing of the* grammatical pronouns, one can be sure that the discourse 
is in a personal system [un systerac de la perscnnpj the ■•/hole of the 
beginning of Joldfinger. although written in the third person, is in 
fact, spoken by James Bond; for the. mood to charge it is necessary for 
such rewriting to be impossible; thus the sentence: "ho noticed a man of 
about fifty, still with a youthful spring in his step etc", is perfectly 
personal, despite the he (I, James Bond, noticed etc.") but the narrative 
utterance "the clinking of the ice in the glass seo;:ed tc give Bond a 
sudden flash of inspiration" cannot bo personal, because of the presence 
of the verb "seem", which becomes the sign of the a-porsonal (net tho he)
It is a certain fact that the a-porsonal is the traditional mode of the 
narrative, language having elaborated, a whole system proper to the 
narrative (articulated on the aorist ) designed to efface the presence 
of the speaker: "In the narrative, says 3envenista, nobody speaks". 
Nevertheless, the personal mode (disguised to a greater or lessor degree) 
has gradually invaded the narrative, the narration being related to the 
hie et nunc of speech (this is the definition of tho personal system); 
today it is noticeable that many narratives, among them sene of the most 
flowing ones, mix within a very small space, often 'within a single sentence, 




were glued to those of clu Pont who did 
not know what expression to adopt personal
for this fixed stare comprised a nixturo 
of candour, irony, and self deprecation a-personal
This process of nixing tho systems is obviously regarded as a 
convenient device. This device can even be used to trick the reader: 
one of Agatha Christie's"detective novels (Five Twenty Five) only preserves 
its secret by cheating ahput the person in which it is written: a 
character is described from within when he is already the murderer5 . 
everything happens as if there was in the sane character the consciousness 
of a witness, immanent to the discourse, and the concicusness of a 
murderer^ immanent to the referent: only the abuse of a mixing of the twe 
systems allows the mystery to be maintained. It is understandable, 
therefore, that at the other end of the literary scale, tho strict 
maintainanco of the chosen system becomes a necessary condition of the 
work - although tho system cannot always be honoured right to the end.
This strictness - striven for by certain contemporary writers - is 
not necessarily an aesthetic essential} what is usually described as the 
psychological novel is normally distinguished by tho mixing of the two 
systems and successfully utilises the signs of the non-person and those 
of the person} "psychology" - paradoxically - cannot remain within the 
confines of a system of persons, for in bringing the whole narrative 
solely to the node of the discourse, or if you prefer, to the act of speech, 
it is the content of the person itself which is threatened: the 
psychological person (of a referential order) bears no relationship to 
the linguistic person, which is never defined by moods, aims or character 
traits, but-only by its (coded) place in the discourse. It is this 
formal person which people strive to speak today; it is a matter of an 
important process of subversion (tho public is under tho impression 
that no one is writing "novels" any more) for it is an attempt to make the 
narrative pass from the order of statement [ordro ccnstatif ] (to which, 
up till now, it was confined) to tho order of performance [ ordre 
according to which the sense of a word is the act of which it is m e  issue 
today writing is net "recounting", it is saying that one is recounting 
and relating the whole referent ("what is said") to this act of speech 
[locution], this is why one section of contemporary literature is no 
longer descriptive, but transitive, striving to achieve in the word an 
immediacy so pure that the whole discourse is identified by the act in 
which it i3 delivered, the whole logos being reduced to - cr extended to - 
a lexis'* .
2* The Situation of the Narrative
The level'of narration therefore is occupied by tK6 signs of 
narrativity, the collection of features which reintegrate functions and 
actions into the narrative communication, articulated as the door and 
receiver. Some of those signs nave already been examined: in oral 
literatures one can distinguish certain recitation codes (metric formu­
lae, presentational conventions), and it is clear that the '.'author'1 is 
not the person whe invents the best stories but the person who best 
controls the codas, the use of which he snares with listeners: in these 
literatures, the level of narration is so clcarrcut, its rules so strict 
that it is difficult to conceive of a •'star;,"’ without the coded signs 
of the narrative ("once upon a time", etc.). In our written literatures 
the "forms of th«~ discourse" have very soon boon fixed (they arc, in 
fact, signs of narrativity): classification of the author's ways of 
intervention outlined by'Plato, taken up by Dioucdes, coding of the 
beginnings and endings of narratives, definition of the different stylos 
of presentation (oratio directa, orats.- indirecta with its inquit. 
oratio tocta)^, study of the "points of view" etc. All these elements 
are part of the level of narration. It is obviously necessary to 
add writing [l'ecriture] as a whole, since its role is not to "transmit" 
the narrative but to display it.
It is in fact in a narrative display that the units of the lower 
levc-ls are integrated: the final for... of the narrative, as a narrative, 
transcends its content and its narrativ; forms (functions and actions). 
This explains w iy the narrationni cede is the final level possible for 
our analysis, without stopping outside the object narrative; that is, 
without broakin., the rule of immanence on which it is based. The narra­
tive can only, in fact, receive its meaning from th„ world which uses 
it: beyond the level of narration the world begins; that is to say, 
other systems (social, economic, ideological), the terras of which are 
no longer solely narratives but elements of other materials (historical 
facts, denominations, components, etc.). Just as linguistics stops 
at the sefitonce, the analysis of the narrative stops at the discourse: 
after that it is necessary to move to another semiotics. Linguistics 
calls this type of boundary, which has already been postulated - if 
not fully explored - a situation. Halliday defines the "situation" 
(related to a sentence) as a collection of unconnected linguistic 
facts, ° Prieto as "a collection of facts known^by the receiver at the 
moment of tile semic act and independent of it.' 0"' In the same way one 
can say that any narrative is dependent on a narrative situat.on, a 
collection of conventions according to which the narrative is consumed. 
In so-called "archaic" societies the narrative situation is strictly 
coded;°^ alone, today, avant-garde literature still dreams of reading 
conventions, histrionic in the case of mallarme, who wonted a book 
to be recited in public accordin to a precise formula, typographic in 
the case of Butor, who wanted a book to be accompanied by his own signs. 
But, evidently, our society is trying, as far as possible, to get 
rid of the coding of the narrative situation: one loses
(continued)
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count of tho narrative processes designed tc main the narrative seem more 
natural, protending to give it a natural causo of erLstsnee and to 
"3isintroduce” it: opistolary novels, supposedly discovered manuscripts, 
an author who meets the narrator, films which start tho story boforo the 
credit titles. Reluctance to display its codes is a mark of bourgeois 
society and the mass culture which has developed fror, it: both need
signs which do not appear to be signs. This is only however, a structural 
epiphenomenon: however familiar, however careless nevraeays the act of 
opening a novel, or a newspaper, or switching on a television nothing can 
prevent the fact that this trivial act sets up within us, at a stroke 
and in it entirity, the narrative code which we Jhall need. The level 
6f narration therefore, ha3 a sort of ambiguous role: contiguous to tho 
narrative situation (and, sometimes even including it) it opens onto the 
world in which the narrative unwinds (is consumed); but at the same 
time, crowning the preceding levels, it closes the narrative,establishes 
it finally as the word of a language which forecasts end brings its 




Language can be defined as the interplay of two fundamental 
processes: articulation or segmentation, which produces tho units (this, 
according tr. Benvcnistc, is the fern), integration, which collects 
those unit3 into units of a higher level (this io tho moaning) •
This dual process is also found in the language cf the narrative; it also 
recognises processes of orientation and integration, fora and nooning.
1* Distortion and Expansion.
The fora of the narrative is, in essence, is corked by two powers: 
that of distending its signs throughout the ccur3e of tho story, and that 
of inserting in these distortions unforosoablo oirvansicns. These two powers 
seen to be freedoms, but* the property cf thg„r.arrativa is precisely, to 
include these •’deviations'*’ in its language. *
Distortion of tho signs existg^in language, where Bally studies it, 
with regard to French and German; there is di 3 taxi a [dystaxie] , as 
soon as £ho signs (of a message) are no longer simply in juxtaposition, 
as soon as the (logical) linearity is disturbed (for example, the predicate 
preceding the subject). A notable example of dystaxia is encountered 
when tho parts of a single sign are separated by. other signs in the course 
of the message (for example the negation ne jamais and the verb a pardonne 
in the sentence: ello ne vous a janais y ardcnn6): the sign being split 
up, what is sicpiifiod[ signifies] is divided among several signifiers 
Lsignigiants] separated from each other, and which cannot be understood 
if taken separately. It ha3 already been pointed out at tho level cf 
function, this is exactly what takes place in tho narrative: the units of 
a sequence, although they fora a whole at tho level of that sequence, can 
bo separated from each other by units from ether sequences: as has teen 
remarked, the structure of the level of functions i3 fugue-like.
According to the terminology of Bally, who contrasts synthetic languages, 
where dystaxi*- predominates (such as German) and analytic languages, 
which should greater respect for logical linearity and nonsenia (such as 
French), the narrative would be a strongly synthetic language, based 
essentially on a syntax of dovetailing, and interlocking: each point of tho 
narrative radiates in several directions at once: when Janes Bend orders 
a whisky while waiting for the plane, this whisky, os an indication, has 
a polysemic (polysenique) value, it is a sort of cyniclie knot which unites 
several signified notions (modernity1* wealth, leisure), but as a 
functional unit, the ordering cf the whisky should, gradually, run through 
several stages (drinking, waiting, departure etc.) in rdcr to find its 
final meaning: the unit "imprisoned in" (prise) the narrative as a whole, 
yet the narrative is only "viable" through tho distortion and proliferation 
of it3 units.
Generalised distortion gives the language cf the narrative its 
distinguishing mark: a phenemonen of pure logic since it is based on an 
often distant relationship and it establishes a sort of confidence in 
the intellective memory, it is constantly substituting moaning for the 
simple copying of related events, in "life" it is unlikely that in an 
encounter the fact of sitting down would not immediately follow the
The Narrative System.
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invitation to .take a seat; in tho narrative these elements, contiguous 
from a mimetic' point of view, may be separated by a long succession cf 
insertions belonging to totally different spheres of function: thus is 
established a sort of logical time, which bears little relation to 
real time, the apparent splitting-up of the units always being firmly 
maintained under the logic which unites the nuclei of the sequence.
The “suspense11 is obviously only a privileged or strained [exaspere] 
form of the distortion: on one hand by maintaining an open sequence (by 
emphatic processes of delay and projection), it reinforces the contact 
with tho reader, performs a manifestly phatic function; and-on the othe 
hand it presents the thread of -in unfinished sequence, an open paradigm 
(if as we believe every sequence possesses pvo poles);that is to say, 
a lqgical upset, and it is this upset which*is consumed with agony and 
pleasure (inasmuch as xi is always, finally} repaired); the ’’suspense" 
is, therefore, . game flayed with, the structure, designed to put it at 
risk and to glorify it: it constitutes a real “thrilling*’ of the intel­
lect: by revealing the order (and no longer the series) in its fragilit 
it fulfills the very idea of language: what appears the most pathetic 
is also«tho most intellectual: sus ;ense captivates by means of the 
“mind*’, not the “emotions". °
What can be separated can also be filled in. Distended, the 
functional nuclei present intercalary spaces which can be filled in, 
almost to infinity; one can fill in the interstices with a large number 
of catalysises, nevertheless, here a new typology may intervene, for 
the freedom of the catalysises can be governed according to the content 
of the functions (some functions are better exposed to the catalysises 
than others: waiting, for exa.ple)®?, and according to the material of 
the narrative (the writing [ecriturej has possibilities of diaeresis - 
and therefore of catalysis - far superior to those of films: it is 
possible to "cut" a gesture which is related more easily than the same 
gesture visualised)*^. The catalytic power of tho narrative has as a 
corollary its power of ellipsis. On one hand, a function (he ate a 
substantial, meal) can omit all the potential catalysises w. ich it 
implies (the details of the meal); on the other hand it is possible to 
reduce a sequence to its nuclei and a hierarchy of soquynccs to its 
highest terms, without altering the meaning of the story: a narrative 
can be identified, even if its whole syntagm is reduced to its actants 
and its main functions, as they result from the progressive assumption 
of the functional units'7 . In other words, th.» narrative offers itself 
to a summary (what was previously called the plot). At first sight, 
this is the case with all discourse: but each discourse has its own 
type of summary: tho lyric poem for example, being simply the vast meta­
phor ef one single signified notion,”^  to summarise it would be a proce: 
so drastic that it would annihilate the whole identity of the poem (in 
summary, lyric poems are reduced to the signified notions Love and Peat* 
This results in the conviction that a poem cannot be summarised. On 
the other hand a summary of the narrative (it is carried out according 
to structural criteria) retains the individuality of tile menage. In 
other words, the arrative is
(continued)
trana latablo without any basic damage being caused* irhat cannot be
translated is only dotorainod at the final level, that of narration:
the signifying features of narrativity, for example, can, only with
difficulty, move frota tho novel to the film, which ?nly in exceptional
cases race raises personal treatment;72 and the final layer cf the level
of nattation, namely tho writing, cannot pass free: cr.o language tc
another (or passes very badly). The translatability. cf the narrative
results from the structure of its language; conversely, it should therefore
be possible to distinguish this structure by distinguishing and
classifying the (diversely) translatable or|c% untranslatable elements of
a narrative: the (present) existence cf different and concurrent
3ouiotics (literature, cinema, conics, broadcasting) should greatly
facilitate this method of analysis.%
3* Mimesis and Meaning.v
In the language of the narrative the second important process is 
that of integration: what ha3 boon disjointed at cr.o level (a soquenco 
for oxauplo) is reunited, most often at a higher level (a sequence high 
in the hierarchy, the total signified feature of scattered indications, 
the action of a category of characters); tho complexity of a narrative 
may be compared with that of an organigram, capable cf integrating turnings 
back and jumps forward, or mere precisely, it is integration, under various 
forms, which compensates for the apparently uncontrollable complexity 
of the units of a certain level: it is integration which acts as a 
compass tc guide one through discontinued, contiguous and heterogenous 
elements (os they are given in the syntn-ja which recognises only one 
dimension: succession), if, like Greimas, cno describes the unit of 
signi'fication (that, ter example, which permeates a sign and its context) 
isctogy, one can say that integration is a factor cf isotopy: each 
(intogratory) level gives its isotopy to the units cf a lower level, 
prevents the meaning fron "balling" [bailer] which v/ouid certainly happen 
if one could not penetrate the displacements of the levels. However, 
integration of the narrative does net take place in a completely regular 
way, like a beautiful piece of architecture which progresses through a 
symmetrical network composed of numbers of simple elements to a few 
complex masses: very often one unit can have two correlates, one on one 
level (the function of a sequence) the other cn another level (an 
indication refering to an actant); the narrative thus appears as a 
succession of imodiate and imnodiate elements, closely dovetailed; dystaxia 
guides one to a "horizontal"reading, but integration superimposes on it 
a "vertical" reading: tnere is a sort of structural "figure-eight" like 
a constant game of potentials, the various falls [chutesjof which give 
the narrative its "tonus" or energy: each unit i3 perceived at a 
superficial level and in depth and this is how the narrative "works": 
by the interplay of these two proCGSCviG the structure put3 out branches, 
proliferates, comes to light - and pulls itself together again:the new thing 
i3 always regular. There is, of course, a freedom cf the narrative
26,
(juat as there is a freedom for any speaker with regard to his 
language), but thi3 froedon is literally "bounder’": between tho strict 
code of the language and thcstrict code of the' narrative, there is formed 
a hollow in the sentence: if one trios to cnccmpass a written narrative 
in its entirety, one can see that it moves from tho most strongly coded 
point (tho phonenatic or ever merismatic level) and unwinds  ^radually to 
the sentence, the extreme point of freedom of composition, then begins 
to tighten up again, moving from small groups cf sentences (unicoo 
sequences) still very freo, to the main actions, which form a strong and 
restricted codo: the creativity of the narrative (at least in its 
mythical appearance of "life") would seen to bo located between two cedes 
that of linguistics and'that of translinguistics* This is why it i3 
possible to say paradoxically that art (in the romantic sense of the 
word)is a matter of utterance of detail, while imagination is control of 
the code: "in short", says Poc "it will be seen that the craftsman is 
always full of the imaginative and the really imaginative man is never 
anything but an analyst..."*''
It is necessary therefore, to look again at the realism of the 
narrative. Receiving a phene call in the office where he is on guard,
Bond "thinks to himself", the author tells us: "concsunic tions with 
Kong Kong arc always bad and always difficult to obtain"• However, 
neither Bond's "thinking", or the poor quality of telephone communications 
are really the information being conveyed: this passage may give an 
impression of "vividness" but the real information is the location of 
the phone call, Hong-Kcno. Thus, in any narrative, the imitation of life 
is a contingent quality:7 the function of the narrative is not to 
"represent", it is to provide a display which is still an enigma to us, 
but which can only be of a ainetic order: the "reality" of a sequence 
does not lie in the "natural" succession of the actions of which it is 
composed, but in the logic which is revealed in it, is risked and is 
satisfied: in other words, one might say that the origin cf a sequence 
is not the"observation of reality, but the need to vary-and to surpass the 
first form which presents itself to man, repetition: a sequence is, 
essentially, a whole within which nothing is repeated: hare logic has 
an emancipating value - and the whole narrative with it; it nay be that 
man is constantly reinjecting into the narrative what he had known, what 
ho has lived; at least it is in a form which, itself, ha3 triumphed over 
repetition and established a pattern for the future. The narrative does 
not show, it doe3 net imitate; the excitement which can take possession 
of us on reading a novel is net that of "something seen" (in fact we do 
net sec anything), it is that of the meaning, that is of a relationship 
of a light order, which also possesses its own emotions, hopes, threats, 
triunphs: "what takes place in a narra.tiye is fre* the,referential (real) 
point of view literally "nothing" 5 "what happens is language itself, the 
adventure of language which is constantly being celebrated, although 
little more is known about the origins of the narration than about the 




the contemporary of the monologue, which seems to have cooo after 
the dialogue} in any case, without wishing to force the -phylogenetic 
hypothesis, it could be significant that it is at about the same time 
(the age of three) that the young of man "invents" at once, the 
sentence, t".: narrative and the Oedipus complex* .-*>
.U
V
11* This is 'not the case, it must be noted, with poetry or the 
essay which defend on the cultural level of the consumer*
2. Cf course there does exist in "art" of writing: it is the 
power to fora narratives (messages) from the structure (code); 
this art corresponds to tho notion of performance in Chomsky, 
and this notion is far removed from the romantic concept of an 
guthor's ••genius".
3* The story of tho ilittita a , postulated by ^ .usaua^eond discovered, 
in fact, fifty years later in E.Cenveniste: rrcblomos de lingui3tiquc 
generate Gallinard, JL966 p*35«
4* Let us remember the present state cf linguistic description: 
"•••.Linguistic structure is always relative, net only to the 
fundamentals of the corpus but also to tho grammatical theory 
which describes these fundamentals" (E*3ach, An Introduction 
to transformational Grammars , fiew York, 1964* : *29* And this 
from Benveniste (op.cit. p.119)....." it has been recognised that 
language should be described as a formal structure, but that this 
description demanded, to begin with, tho establishment of adequate 
preceodures and criteria and that, in short, the reality of the 
object was insepcrable from tho method used tc define it,
5. The apparently "abstract" nature cf the theoretic contributions 
which follow in this edition springs from a concern for methodology 
that of rapidly formulating concrete analyses: tho formalisation
is not a generalisation like the others.
6. But not essential (Cl. Bremond's contribution, for example, 
i3 based more on logic than linguistics)
7* "Reflexions sur la- Phrase", in Language and Society (Melanges 
Jansen), Copenhagen, 1961, p.113.
8. It goes without saying, as Jakobson has observed, that between 
the sentence and what i3 beyond it there are transitions: 
coordination, for example, can act beyond tho sentence*
9. See especially: Benveniste, op. cit., ch.X - L.3.Morris:
"Biscourse Analysis", Language, 28, 1952, 1-50 - H.Muuod:
".uialysc Jtructurnle d'un Pcene Froncais", linguistics 3» 1964,62-8 3.
10. One cf the tasks of linguistics cf discourse would be to 
establish a typology for tho discourse. Provisionally, it i3 
possible to recognise throe main typos of discourse: motonyraic 
(narrative), metaphoric (lyric poetry, loomed discourse), 
enthymenatic (intellectual discursive).
-2-
Ci. infra, 111. 1.
-lernc's notion, formed at the tire when fca was projecting - 
a work on linguistics: Language appeared as the instrument of 
fiction: it will follow the method of language (to determine it). 
Language reflecting itself, r'inally, fiction seems to be the 
very product of the human spirit - it is language which 3ots at 
stake all aethod, and nan is reduced to -.rill. {'louvres Completes, 
Pleiade, p.85l) Cne remembers that fer • .?.3.r.rr : ;7ictier, or 
poetry"(ib., p.3 3 5 ).
Linguistic descriptions arc never monovalent. A description 
is net right or wr^ng, it is better or worse, mere or less useful . 
(J.K.Halliday: "Linguistique Generalc et Linguistique Appliquuc", 
Studes tie Linguistique Appliques, 1, 1962, a.12.
The levels cf integration have already been postulated by the 
Prague School (see J.Vachek: A Prague School .deader in Linguistics, 
Indiana Univ.Press, 1964, p.468) and since taken up by many 
students of linguistics. It i3 , in our .pinion, Zenvoniste who 
has provided the most illuminating analysis (op. cit.,ch.X)'
15. "In somewhat vague terms, a level can be considered as a 
system of symbols, rules etc. which are used to represent 
expressions" (E.Gach, op.cit. p.57-56)
lo. The third category of rhetoric, ivontic, did net deal with 
language: it concerned the res not the verba.
17. Anthropology structur>"lc , p. 233
18. The present edition, infra: "Les Categories c’u decit Litteraire".
1 9 . I have tried, in this introduction, to interfere as little as 
possible with current research.
20. Sec es-xjcially 3.Tonachovski, Theraatiquc (19?<5)» in: Theorie 
de la Litterature, Senil, 19 6 5 - A little later Progp defined a 
function as "the action of a character, defined fra: the point of 
view of its signigicance for the development of the story as a 
whole" (Morphology of folktale, p.2C). Kcre wo see T.Tedovov's 
definition ("The meaning (or function) of an clement of the work 
is its power to enter intc correlation with other elements of the 
work, and with the work as a whole"), and the contributions of 
i..J.Greimas, who comes to define the unit by its aradignatic 
correlation, tut also by its place within the syntagmatic unit of 






21m Thus it'is not only "life" which recognises the existence
of "crossed linos". "Creased lines (that beyend which is 
invisible) can exist in art but as a ceded element ('.fatteau, 
for example); as yet this "indistinction" is unknotm in written 
codes: writing is fatally clear.
22. At least in literature, where the freedom of rotation (resulting 
from the abstract nature of articulate -language' brings a,much 
stronger responsibility than in "analogous" arts, such as tho 
cinema.
23. The functionality of the narrative unit is aero or les3 
immediate (therefore apparent), dcr. ending on tho level at which 
it acts: when the units are on the some level (in cite- case of 
suspense, for example), funtionality is vory sensitive, much less 
whore tho function is saturated on tho narrational level: a modern 
text, not vory strongly signifying in the field cf the anecdote, 
only finds great force of meaning in the field of writing.
24. "Tho syntactical units (beyond the sentence) arc in fact units 
of content" (A.J.Greimas, Cour3 do Semantic;ue Structuralo,
c„ur.p ro*ootypo, v.l. 5) - The cxt 1 oration of the functional level, 
therefore, forms part of general semantics.
25. "One should not take tho word as an indivisible clement of
literary art, treat it a3 the brick with which the building is 
constructed. It can be broken down into much smaller "verbal 
elements". • (J.Tyninnov, quoted by T.Todovov in Lor,j 6,p.l8)
26. These designations, like those which follow, are only provisional.
27* This--does not prevent finally syntngnatic display of the -functions 
from being able- to recover paradigmatic relationships between 
separate functions, as has Veen .admitted since Levi Strauss and 
Groimas.
28. It is impossible to reduce the- functions to actions (verbs) 
and the indications to qualities (adjectives), since- there are 
actions which indicate, are "signs" of a personality, of an 
atmosphere etc.
29. Valery spoke of "dilatory signs". Tho detective novel makes 
considerable use of these "red herring" units.
30. N.Ruict, calls a parametric element an element which- is constant 
throughout the course of a piece of music (for example the tempo 
of a Bach allegro, tho nonodic character cf a sole).
4-
*
31. In this 'edition, G.Genetto distinguishes two s.:rts of 
descriptions: ornamental and significative. Tho significative 
description should obviously be linked to tiie level- cf the 3tory 
and the ornamental description to the level cf the discourse, 
which explains how it has long formed a perfectly "coded piece" 
of rhetoric: the doscriptio or okphrasia a very highly valued 
exercise of -._e-rhetoric.
32. Poetics, 1459 a.
33. /.noted by Cl.Bretiond, "Le Message Norrati? :, Ccceuunicat iens
No. 4, 1964.* %
34. Anant on livre (Ocuvses completes, Ploiado, g.3oo)
35* In his own way, as always p-rbegtive but underdeveloped,
Vagary clearly state! the rules of narrative time: "The belief in 
time as agent and tho conductor is based on the mechanism of the 
memory and that of the constructed discourse" v?ei 11 348;
we would underline this: the unison is, in fact, produced by the 
discourse itself.
36. This concept recalls an Aristotelean notion: the groairosis, 
the rational choice of actions to perform, establishes the 
praxis, which produces nothing distinct fre-r: the agent, contrasted 
with tho poiesis in these terns, one night say the analyst is 
trying to reconstitute the praxis within tho narrative.
37. T.his logic, based on the alternative (to dc this r that) 
has the merit of accounting for the process of dramatisation 
of which the narrative is usually the base.
3 8 . In the Lgr.lmslevion sense of double implication: two terns 
presuppose each other.
30. It is quite possible to find, even at this very low level, a
contrast, on a paradigmatic model, if not between two terms, at 
least between two polos of a sequence: the sequence offer of a 
cigarette extends by suspending it the parr.digr.: Tangcr/Gecurity 
(revealed by Cheglov in his analysis of the ohorleck holmes cycle), 
Suspicion/Pretcction,..^ pression/friondlincss.
4C. This counterpoint has boon forecast by the fuseion fonur.listo
who have outlined the typology: it recalls the principle "twister" 
structures of the sentence (et.infra, V,I.)
Lot us not forget that classical tragedy only recognises 
"actors,‘not "characters".
4l
42, The"character person" holds sway in the bourgeois novel) in
War and Peace Nicolai 'Rostov is, froci tho outside, a good sport, 
loyal, brave, fiery: Prince Andrei a thoroughbred, disillusioned 
etc: what happens to them illustrates their personality but does 
not fom it.
43. If part of contemporary literature has attacked tho "character" 
it is not in order to destroy it (an impossibility), but to 
depersonalise it, a totally different matter. A navel which is 
apparently without characters, like Draue by Philippe Golic-rs, 
completely obliterates tho person in favour cf the language, but 
nevartholess retains basically a game of‘actants, confronting 
tho very action of the word. This literature still recognises 
a '’subject", but this "subject" is henceforth that cf the language.
44.
45.
Sonantique Structurale, Larcusse, 1966, \>. I?.?
j. hy.r?v'r.-l it has largely accredited those condensing operations - 
Mallorue said of Hanlut "Thoro must bo other characters, for in tho 
ideal production everything moves according to a syoi.< lie reciprocity 
of typos, among themselves or related to a single figure".
(Crayonne ,u Theatre, Pleiade, p.3Cl)
46. For example: narrations where the object and subject are fused 
into one character are narratives of tho search for self, one's 
own identity (The Golden Ago); narratives whore the subject 
pursues a succession of objects (Mme.3ov-ary) etc.
47. K, Eco's analysis of the Jamo3 Bond cycle, later in this issue, 
rofers'nora to the game than to language.
48. Gee the analyses of the person given by LonveniSte in FroLletnes 
de Llnguistique Generate.
49. Double bang a Bangkok. The sentence functions as a "wink" to 
the reader, as if one turned towards him. On the ether hand, the 
sentence "Thus Leo had just gone out" is a narrator's sign,' 
since it forms part of a reasoning process .?f r. character.
50. In this issue, Todowcv deals with tho narrator's picture 
and the reader's picture.
Vhen will someone write fro..; the point of view of a heavenly 
joke,Ihis is to say as God sees them? (Flaubert, -reface a-la 
vie d*un ocri'.r^ i_ Sonil, 1965, p.9l)
51
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52. ii distinction which is nil the more necessary, or. the scale with 
v/hich we are dealing, since historically, a considerable nunber 
of narratives are authorless (oral narratives, fclk tales, epics 
handed down through generations etc.)
55* J.LaC'-r.: "Is the subject of v/hich I speak v/hen I speak, the
sane us that which I speak?"
54. E.3envcniste, ep.cit.
55. Personal raoed "It even seemed to .1 -.m _.c t . t r.ot'-ing rsened 
changed, etc." - Iho process is even store crude in The kurdar of 
Joger ^ckroyd, since the murderer openly says _!
56. On the performative el.infra T.Todci’ov's contribution - The
classic example of the perfornativo is the utterance: I declare 
war, which does not "state" or "describe" anythin;, hut exhausts 
its meaning in its own utterance (in contrast -./its the utterance: 
the king has declared war, which is a statement and a description)
57. On the contrasx cf the logos and lexis, see the article by
G.Genette.
58. Genus activum vel imitativum (is intrusion cf the narrator
into the discourse: draiaa for example); genus ennatativum 
(only the poet speaks: maxims .didactic poetry); • onus cc^mno 
(mixture of the two types: the epic).
59. H.Sorensen. Melanges Jansen, p. 15'h.
60. J.K.Halliday: "bi:.. f-_~ ti .v.e.joncralc et lin juistisue r.pyliquee" 
in Etudes do linjuistiquo aprliquoe, No. 1, ifS?., u.6.
61. L.J.Prieto: Principos do Noolc-gie, i.outrn et Co. ,19,64, p.36.
62. The story, L.So'bag reminds us, can be spoken at any time in 
any place, but not the* mythological narrative.
63. Valery: "The novel, ir. fern, is close to the dream; both can be
defined by the curious property : that all their digressions 
should belong tc then.
Ch.harry: linguirtique generale 3t lin-poistique 
Borne, 4th ed. 1965.
64 fr.ancaiso
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65. Cf. Lovi - Strauss (Anthropologic Structural:; :
xlaticnsh'ips which come from the sane group car. appear at 
distant intervals, when taken from a diachronic point cf view" - 
A.J.Greiraas insists on the separation of the func ci ciis 
(Semantique Structurale).
b
66. J.P.Fayc, on Klosscvski 1 s 3aphonet; "-iaroly has a piece cf 
fiction (or narrative) so clearly revealed what it must, of 
necessity, be: an experimentation cf "thought" on "life" (Tel . .• • r- 
no. 2 2. p.88)
6?. Waiting has, logically, only two nuclei : 1 st, the act of
waiting posited; 2nd; act of waiting satisfied or disappointed: but 
the first nucleus can be extensively catalysed, even to infinity 
(Waiting for Godot): again a game, this time an extreme case, 
with the structure.
68. Valery: "Proust divides - and gives us the impression of being 
able to do so indefinitely - what other writers have been 
accustomed to pass over.
69. Again, one must be specific according to the material: literature 
has an uneven power cf ellipsis - the cinema has not.
70. This reduction does not necessarily, correspond with the 
division of the book into chapters: it seems that, on the 
contrary, more and more, the role of the chapter is to institute
a break, that is to say, suspense (a technique used in the novellett«).
7 1. N.-iuwet ("Analyse structurale d'un pcome francais," linguistics 
no. 3) 1964, p.32): "The- poem can be understood as the result cf a 
series of changes applied tc the proposition "I levs ”ou". Ruwet, 
here, rightly alludes to the analysis’ of paran.id delirium given
by Freud concerning, . , ,Schrcber (Five hsychcanalyses).
i reel mnt
72. Here again there is no relationship between the grammatical 
"person" of the narrator and the "parscnnlity" (or subjectivity) given 
by a producer in his method of presenting a story: the camera - Z 
(constant identification with what is seen by the character) is
an exceptional phenomenon in this history of the cinema.
73. Le double assassinat do la rue horgue, trans. baudalaire.
74. G.Gonette is right tr. reduce tc the pieces cf related dialogue
(el.infra); yet the dialogue always induces an int.elli.gjilbJ^  if.mpft 
aand not mimetic.
75. Mallarme (Crayonne .u Theatre, Pleiad, p.296:..."a dramatic
work shows the succession of external actions without at any time 
having any reality and without, finally, anything hap ening.
